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Abstract – Catchability is crucial for the economic performance of fisheries and their management. However, in many
bio-economic simulation models it is assumed to be either constant or it is largely ignored, despite the fact that it
is known to vary due to technical, environmental and behavioral factors. Such variation can cause the relationship
between eﬀort and fishing mortality to be nonlinear. This paper provides evidence for the possibility of nonlinear
optimizing behavior from the Dutch beam trawl fishery, provides a methodology for estimating the curvature of the
resulting relation, and a simple way of implementing these processes within a bio-economic model. Moreover, it shows
the influence of a nonlinear relationship between eﬀort and fishing mortality in a model of eﬀort management (EU
long-term flatfish management plan).
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1 Introduction
In fisheries management, catchability is the link between
fishing eﬀort and the resulting fishing mortality. Catchability
is defined as the proportion of available fish in a population
that would be captured by a unit of eﬀort. Because of this
relationship, catchability is crucial to the economic perfor-
mance of fisheries and their management. However, in many
bio-economic simulation models catchability is assumed to be
either constant or it is largely ignored, despite the fact that it
is known to vary due to technical, environmental and behav-
ioral factors (Overholtz et al. 1995; Anon. 2006a). Ignoring the
variability of catchability is likely to bias the results of these
models and lead to flawed management decisions (Pascoe et al.
2001; Ulrich et al. 2002).
The aim of this paper is to begin to address this short-
coming in the literature by proposing a model that allows
catchability to vary. We do so by: (1) estimating the potential
eﬀect of the optimization of fishing behavior on catchability
in a situation in which eﬀort (total number of sea days) is re-
stricted and providing empirical evidence for the possibility
of optimization behavior by fishers within an eﬀort regulated
fishery; and, (2) showing the eﬀect of such behavior on catch-
ability and, as a consequence, on fleets and stocks within a
long-term management program.
a Corresponding author: Hans.vanOostenbrugge@wur.nl
Variation in catchability has been studied extensively, gen-
erally for purposes other than bio-economic modeling, namely
to standardize catch per unit of eﬀort (CPUE) data as an in-
dicator of fish abundance (e.g. Addisson et al. 2003; Bishop
2006; Marchal et al. 2003; Olin et al. 2004). Many experimen-
tal studies provide information about the eﬀects of technical
gear characteristics, environmental factors and fish behavior
on catchability, and this knowledge is incorporated in the use
of fish surveys. Data from commercial fisheries can provide an
inexpensive alternative to these surveys. However, the value of
such data is limited by the targeting behavior of fishers. For ex-
ample, Ellis and Wang (2007) showed for the Australian north-
ern prawn fishery that targeting behavior increased catchabil-
ity in some areas by 10%. However, in these studies no link
was drawn to management measures and the eﬀects changes
in catchability can have on their results.
Fisher behavior has been taken into consideration in man-
agement evaluations, but is most often concerned with the
eﬀects of spatial management measures, such as marine pro-
tected areas (Pelletier and Mahevas 2005). The main assump-
tion in these models is that fishers optimize their behavior in
order to maximize their utility (Hutton et al. 2004). However,
with a few exceptions, these models only simulate short-term
eﬀort reallocation and do not assess the eﬀects on catchability
(Pelletier and Mahevas 2005).
Article published by EDP Sciences
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Certain processes underlying the variation in catchability
of commercial fishing fleets have been studied. It has been
found that technical developments in the fishing fleet may
increase catchability over time (technical creep) which may
bias assessments that use catch data and predictions of bio-
economic models (e.g. Pascoe et al. 2001; Ulrich et al. 2002
and Rijnsdorp et al. 2006). Also, management measures such
as the introduction of exclusion zones aﬀected the cacthabil-
ity of the fleet, partly through reallocation of fishing eﬀort
(Pascoe et al. 2001). Both Ulrich et al. (2002) and Rijnsdorp
et al. (2006) studied technical creep in relation to restric-
tions in fishing eﬀort. Using a bio-economic simulation model,
Ulrich et al. (2002) showed that the outcomes of the total al-
lowed eﬀort limits (TAE) were especially sensitive to variabil-
ity in catchability, while incorrect catchability parameters in
the model resulted in underestimation of the fishing mortal-
ity and overestimation of the spawning stock biomass (SSB).
Rijnsdorp et al. (2006) studied eﬀort and fishing mortality
to fine-tune management regulations, noting that through the
optimization behavior of fishers, fishing mortality could be
aﬀected less than proportionally by eﬀort reductions.
Since the introduction of management plans, eﬀort limi-
tations have become more popular in EU Atlantic fisheries.
Insight into how fishers can be expected to react and thereby
change catchability will be of critical importance to the success
of these plans. The main goal of these eﬀort limitation plans is
to reduce excess fishing and the resulting discards caused by
the misbalance in single species TACs.
One of the models that takes changes in catchability into
account is the EIAA model which was developed to evalu-
ate the economic eﬀects of TAC restrictions in the EU (Anon.
2005). The model calculates fishing activity using a Cobb-
Douglas type inverse production function, and it uses informa-
tion on all relevant TACs, SSBs, prices and historical landings
of non-TAC species. The model assumes that all TACs can be
taken and that landings of non-TAC species will not change.
The price by species is included in the activity function and
assumes that fishers have an incentive to first use fishing ef-
fort on species with the highest value. The weighing proce-
dure results in an average and less than proportional change of
activity compared to changes of the TACs. The EIAA model
tends therefore to produce lower catchability rates. Thus it is
not a very suitable tool for the evaluation of eﬀort restrictions
when one would expect that the optimization behavior of fish-
ers would result in increased catchability (Anon. 2006b).
The starting point of our analysis of the fishing process
is that as eﬀort becomes more restrictive, fishers have to drop
fishing trips. Because they want to optimize their utility, which
we assume to be economic utility, they will drop those trips
that they perceive to have the lowest expected economic bene-
fit; the least eﬃcient trips are thereby omitted from the fisher’s
portfolio. The sequence of events outlined applies to indi-
vidual fishers as well as to the total fishing fleet if fishing
rights can be easily transferred from one vessel to another
thereby enabling fishers to redistribute fishing opportunities.
Because of this desire to optimize, the average annual catcha-
bility of species will change: The catchability of target species,
from which the catches are positively correlated with the total
value of the catch, will increase (Fig. 1). The catchability of
Fig. 1. Relationship between catch of a target species and eﬀort (both
as the percentage of the initial value) in the case of random exclusion
of fishing trips and catch value optimization.
non-target species might increase or decrease, depending on
the co-occurrence of the species with the target species.
Our analysis is divided into two sections. The first section
uses historical data to estimate the relationship between cu-
mulative eﬀort and catch. The second section incorporates the
findings into a simulation model. We use the case of the Dutch
North Sea flatfish fishery to conduct our analysis. This fishery
is the most important fishery for plaice and sole, contributing
to 39% of the total plaice and 70% of the total sole catch from
the North Sea in 2006 (ICES 2007). More than 80% of the
plaice and 90% of the sole landings of these species are re-
alized by vessels with engines greater than 1500 hp and over
24 m (Anonymous, 2006c). The two main target species make
up more than 82% of the total value of the landings of these
vessels. Since 2002, eﬀort has been increasingly restricted for
these vessels due to the cod recovery plan (EC, 2004). In ad-
dition, in 2007, a flatfish recovery plan (EC, 2005) with eﬀort
restrictions was introduced. The aim of the plan is to reduce
fishing mortality by half over the coming years by reducing
fishing mortality by 10% each year until values of 0.2 for sole
and 0.3 for plaice are achieved. These goals are to be reached
through both TAC and eﬀort reductions.
2 Material and methods
2.1 Historical analysis
The possibilities for optimization were analyzed by means
of a cross-sectional analysis of landings data from large Dutch
beam trawlers (>1500 hp) from 2001–2006. Catch and eﬀort
data were analyzed at the trip level and taken from oﬃcial log-
book data gathered by the Dutch ministry of Agriculture, Na-
ture and Food Quality. These data include catch and eﬀort data
per trip and species, the date and time at which ships depart and
return from a trip, the name of the ship, the power of the main
engine, and the ICES rectangle in which fish were caught.
Total value per unit of eﬀort (VPUE) was used as a proxy
for the utility of a trip, where value is defined in terms of
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revenues and eﬀort is defined as hp-days. Values were cal-
culated using logbook catch and eﬀort information. Prices of
the species in a trip were based on the monthly average price
statistics from Dutch fish auctions.
VPUEt =
∑
i Cit × pim
ft (1)
where
VPUEt = Value per unit of eﬀort of the tth trip,
Cit = Catch of ith species in the tth trip,
pim = Average auction price of ith species in mth trip,
ft = Eﬀort of the tth trip expressed in hp-days.
It was assumed that given a reduction in eﬀort fishers will skip
those trips which they believe will add the least to their to-
tal utility. Fishers are not expected to incorporate the share of
the value of a trip which derives from random variation into
their decisions of which trips to take. Therefore, an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) was used to provide estimates for the
VPUE for each trip based on general spatial and temporal pat-
terns and diﬀerences among ships. We assumed that the esti-
mated VPUE from the ANOVA resembled the “true” value of
a trip which fishers then use to rank trips, as random variation
is averaged out. The catches were log10-transformed to meet
the conditions for parametric analysis of variance. The model
used was:
LVPUEi jk = μ + vi + m j + ak + εi jk (2)
where
LVPUEijk = log10 Value per unit of eﬀort,
μ = overall mean,
vi = eﬀect of ith vessel,
m j = eﬀect of jth month,
ak = eﬀect of kth area,
εi jk = error.
Non-significant terms were removed from the model. Residu-
als were tested for normality and 95% confidence limits were
calculated to compare main group means in case of significant
eﬀects.
The estimated values from the ANOVA were used as a
proxy for the expected value of a trip and, in turn, to estimate
the relationship between eﬀort and the catchability of plaice
and sole. The procedure used was to sort trips in descend-
ing order based on their estimated VPUE. Hereafter, catches
of plaice and sole and eﬀort were accumulated over the trips
and the relationship between cumulative eﬀort and cumulative
catch was estimated for both species using a simple regres-
sion analysis. In the analyses the catchability (q) is assumed to
depend on the eﬀort ( f ) in the following way:
q = a × f b. (3)
Where b is a constant between –1 and 0, indicating the non
linearity of the relationship and a is a constant relating to
the average level of the catchability. The functional form of
this relationship follows from the need to have a continuous,
non-linear increasing relationship between catches and eﬀort.
Based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, it reflects di-
minishing returns to scale. This standard production function
has been widely used to model the relationship between inputs
and outputs in the economic literature (see e.g., Varian 1992).
Assuming a constant exogenous stock abundance within a
year, the relationship between cumulative catch and cumula-
tive eﬀort can be used to estimate the beta by using the follow-
ing regression model:
Ci = α × f β × εi (4)
where Ci is cumulative catch of plaice or sole, f is cumulative
eﬀort expressed in hp-days, α and β regression are coeﬃcients
and εi is the error term. The regression coeﬃcient β is an es-
timate for the constant b in formula 3 plus 1, as all terms in
equation (3) are multiplied by f to come to equation (4). This
methodology was similar as in Kraak et al. (2004).
2.2 Model simulations
To demonstrate the eﬀect of the non-linear relationship be-
tween eﬀort and catches (and thereby fishing mortality), the
estimated relationship between eﬀort and catchability was in-
corporated into a dynamic simulation model for the North Sea
flatfish fishery built using the FLR framework which is a col-
lection of tools programmed in the computer language R that
facilitates the construction of bio-economic simulation models
of fisheries and ecological systems (Kell et al. 2007).
The model was built to evaluate the eﬀects of the long-
term flatfish management plan as evaluated by STECF (Scien-
tific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries, Anon.
2006) in September 2006. Later changes to the management
plan have not been taken into consideration in this study. In
its basic form, it was designed to simulate the impact of the
management plan on stock size and landings over a number
of years. In the model, ICES stock assessments and advanced
biological relationships of, for instance, stock recruitment and
growth, are combined to create age-structured models of sole
and plaice populations. These biological components are com-
bined with management procedures including the harvest con-
trol rules specified in the EU management plan. For the pur-
poses of this paper, an important assumption of the IMARES
model (Wageningen IMARES) is that there is a linear relation-
ship between eﬀort and fishing mortality. A main contribution
of the model in comparison with standard ICES work is that it
provides an approach to combine management and assessment
of two stocks.
On the basis of the EU management plan, the harvest con-
trol rule within the model calculates fishing mortality rates us-
ing Article 4 to set a TAC for plaice, Article 5 to set a TAC
for sole, and a complementary eﬀort limit specified in Arti-
cle 6. The model simulates the stock dynamics for plaice and
sole, multiple fleets, and the fisheries management, including
assessments and management decisions over a specified period
of years. For the simulation years under consideration, 2006 to
2012, the model links eﬀort reduction (Article 6) directly to
a reduction of fishing mortality, which means that the eﬀort
multiplier is reduced by 10% per year and results in a reduc-
tion in eﬀort from 21,255 in 2006 to 11,296 in 2012. More
information on the model features can be found in Machiels
et al. (2007).
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Fig. 2. Relationship between the cumulative value of landings and
cumulative eﬀort for 2006. Sorting of trips is based on estimates of
an ANOVA (see text).
The approach taken was to adjust the catchability for each
year using the following Formula based on formula 3:






q j = catchability in year j,
q0 = catchability in year 0,
f j = fishing eﬀort in year j,
f0 = fishing eﬀort in year 0.
Resulting catches and fishing mortalities were calculated using
the adjusted catchability for each year of the simulation pe-
riod. Simulations over a period of 6 years (2006–2012) were
conducted for 3 values of the coeﬃcient b: 0 (in the case of
constant catchability) and, –0.2 and –0.4. Values of the coef-
ficient were set equal for both species. Simulation results for
each of the scenarios were compared with regards to their im-
pact on spawning stock biomass, catch, total value of the catch,
gross added value to the fishery.
3 Results
3.1 Historical analysis
Figure 2 was constructed using data from 9293 trips in
2006 and illustrates the relationship predicted in Figure 1; sim-
ilar figures appear for the years 2001 to 2005. In short, using
historical data and the behavioral assumptions specified in the
previous section, it is possible to construct a plausible, non-
linear relationship between ordered, cumulative value of the
landings without random fluctuations and cumulative eﬀort.
Table 1 shows the key variables that might allow a fisher
to distinguish between the values of a trip. The ship, area and
Table 1. Analysis of variation for the model including ship, quadrant
and month variables.
D f Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Ship 105 319.84 3.05 79.520 <2.2 × 10−16
Area 91 64.76 0.71 18.577 <2.2 × 10−16
Month 11 159.66 14.51 378.902 <2.2 × 10−16
Residuals 9085 348.01 0.04
Fig. 3. Diﬀerences in total value per unit of eﬀort (VPUE) per month
over the year 2006.
month variables together account for 61% of the variability of
the value of a trip.
The most important factor responsible for the variation in
VPUE was the vessel, accounting for 36% of the total vari-
ability. Additional analysis of the average VPUE for 106 ships
in the year 2006 shows a wide range in values among ships,
from a low of 1.9 Euros per unit of eﬀort to a high of 6.4
with a mean of 3.7. Some ships, whether because of diﬀer-
ences in the physical characteristics of the ship or diﬀerences
in the skills of captain and crew or some other characteristic,
are consistently and predictably better than others at catching
fish, implying that the implications of a reduction of eﬀort will
impinge on some owners more than others.
Similarly, diﬀerences in the average VPUE caused by dif-
ferences in the month fished account for 18% of the observed
diﬀerences in the value of a trip (Fig. 3). Average values range
from a low of 2.8 Euros per unit of eﬀort in May, to a high
of 4.5 in November. Therefore, a reduction in eﬀort, all else
equal, will mean that less profitable trips in the month May
should be dropped from the fisher’s portfolio before those trips
made in, say, November. Finally, the area variable accounts for
a modest 7% of the variability in the value per unit eﬀort over
the year. The decision as to where to fish appears to have less
of an impact on the variation in the value of a trip than the
other two variables; a reduction in eﬀort will therefore have
relatively little influence on where fishers fish.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Relationship between the cumulative catch of plaice (left) and sole (right) versus cumulative eﬀort for Dutch large beam trawlers for
2006.
Table 2. Estimations of regression parameters for relationship be-
tween cumulative catches for plaice and sole and cumulative eﬀort for
2006. A smaller ß estimate value implies greater curvature in the rela-
tionship between catchability and eﬀort and thereby catch and eﬀort
(b = β–1).
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
Plaice1
α 0.037335 0.011266 3.314 0.000923
β 0.957542 0.000679 1409.3 <2× 10−16
Sole2
α 1.31815 0.00526 250.8 <2 × 10−16
β 0.829385 0.00032 2616.1 <2× 10−16
1 Adjusted R-squared: 0.9956.
2 Adjusted R-squared: 0.9987.
Figure 4 shows that, just as in the case of value, catch for
both plaice and sole is decreasing per unit of eﬀort expended.
A reduction in eﬀort will mean first dropping those trips with
less expected catch. However, it is the diﬀerence between the
figures of sole and plaice that is of real interest. Comparison of
the two figures indicates a greater curvature for sole than that
for plaice, perhaps, implying that sole was the species driving
fisher behavior.
Regression results from running equation (4) (Table 2)
confirm a preliminary examination of Figure 4 and indicate
that the curvature of the relation between cumulative catch and
cumulative eﬀort is greater for sole than for plaice in 2006.
However, the greater observed curvature of sole in 2006 is
not consistent over time. While the means of the coeﬃcients
that express the degree of curvature over the years are nearly
identical (plaice= 0.89, sole = 0.84), they are negatively corre-
lated over the period 2001-2006 (Fig. 5). The figure indicates
that for years 2002 and 2004 the value of sole and plaice per
Fig. 5. Coeﬃcients of curvature (β-estimates) for plaice and sole. A
smaller coeﬃcient, all else equal, results in greater curvature.
unit eﬀort could both have been of nearly equal importance in
motivating the priority of fishing trips. In other years, the value
of sole per unit of eﬀort was the primary motivation behind de-
cisions of when and where to fish, a motive that appears to be
of increasing importance in recent years as shown by the fall
in the coeﬃcient for sole and the increase in that of plaice.
One straightforward explanation that accounts for the neg-
ative correlations observed in Figure 5 is the fact that our
observations come from a mixed fishery. In years when varia-
tion in revenue per unit of eﬀort is caused by highly variable
sole landings per unit of eﬀort, plaice landings per unit of eﬀort
have been more stable. Variability of landings per unit eﬀort
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Fig. 6. Three exponents of curvature (b) and their respective impact on the catchability of sole and plaice.
may be caused by various reasons, for example, given eﬀort
limitation, fishers made their choices of which trips to conduct
based primarily on the TAC they perceive to be less constrain-
ing. Other causes of variable landings per unit of eﬀort are
seasonal price changes and temporal closures of the fishery (in
2001 and 2003).
Our model for estimating the curvatures of catch is sim-
plistic. However, adding terms, such as a non-linear variable
for the month fished, did not appreciably change the results.
Residuals from the model show a slightly periodic structure
that should be better accounted for in further studies. The re-
sults were also skewed by data with a higher catch per eﬀort.
The decision was made to keep these data (less than 20 data
points out of more than 8600 for year 2006) within the data set
until there is positive evidence that they represent errors.
4 Simulation analysis
The parameters were implemented within the IMARES
model by using Equation (5) above. Moreover, the model was
adjusted to ensure that the fishing opportunities were only re-
stricted by the eﬀort reduction in the management plan (10%
reduction each year). The following results compare three sce-
narios, the Exp 00 is the linear case, while the Exp –0.2 and
Exp –0.4 represent non-linear cases when the coeﬃcient b in
Equation 5 are, respectively, –0.2 and –0.4. An eﬀort that is
smaller than the base year, raised to a negative power, will
result in a larger catchability for the simulated year (Fig. 6).
As previously discussed, the EU harvest control rules im-
plemented in the IMARES model resulted in a reduction in
eﬀort of 10% for each year of the simulation. That, along with
the negative values for coeﬃcient b we estimated, results in the
continuous increase in catchability for both non-linear scenar-
ios for both sole and plaice. This caused an increase in catch-
ability of around 28% in 2012 in the case of the scenario for
sole with coeﬃcient b = −0.4 compared to the linear case,
having both biological and economic implications. In compar-
ison to the linear case, both non-linear cases result in larger
Fig. 7. Evolution of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) estimates of
sole for model runs with diﬀerent values of exponents of curvature
(b). SSB will be lower given a smaller, more negative, exponent.
fishing mortality rates than intended by the application of the
HRC and hence smaller SSBs (Fig. 7). The figure shows the
situation for sole, the impact on plaice is similar; for instance,
in the last year of the simulation with an exponent of –0.4, the
SSB for plaice was about 18% smaller than that of the linear
case.
A higher catchability, all else equal, means that the chance
that an individual fish will be caught by gear will increase, so
that a lower SSB does not necessarily translate into a lower
catch. In fact, the economic results predicted by the IMARES
model show that the economic implications continue to be pos-
itive; the results for the non-linear cases are better than pre-
dicted by the linear case because the increase in catchability
for a given amount of eﬀort will more than oﬀset the reduction
in SSB (Fig. 8).
However, there appear to be limits to the ability of higher
catchability to oﬀset the lower SSB. Figure 7 shows that while
landings for both non-linear cases are greater than the linear
case for each year of the simulation; landings for the non-linear
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Fig. 8. Evolution of sole landing and net profits for model runs with diﬀerent values of exponents of curvature (b). Higher catchability for a
given eﬀort means higher than expected landings and profits.
cases appear to converge. As simulation time progresses, land-
ings when the exponent is equal to –0.4 fall toward the land-
ings when the exponent is equal to –0.2. Eventually, a higher
catchability reduces the increase in SSB to such a degree
that resulting landings in both non-linear scenarios are nearly
equal. As previously noted, landings in both non-linear sce-
narios never fall to those levels of the linear case and revenues
in both scenarios remain above the linear scenario during this
time horizon. However, it may be the case that if the simula-
tion runs had been extended over a longer period beyond 2012,
the landings and revenues of the non-linear cases may fall to,
or even below, the levels of the linear case. Results for plaice
were similar to those reported for sole. In the last year of the
simulation landings for plaice of both non-linear cases con-
verge, but remain above that of the linear case. Finally, as a
direct result of the higher catches for both species in the non-
linear cases, total revenues for those cases were above the lin-
ear case for each year of the simulation. Once again, revenues
for the non-linear cases converged in later years as landings
converged.
5 Discussion
Our results show it is theoretically possible for fishers to
rank trips in terms of their utility, because they can be distin-
guished by the value they are expected to provide. This ranking
can occur at the level of the fisher, and, given tradable fishing
rights and a well-functioning market for those rights, across
the entire fleet. Our contention is that a reduction in total al-
lowed eﬀort will cause average catchability to rise as fishers
drop less profitable trips from their portfolios, a contention
that is in agreement with conclusions drawn by Rijnsdorp et al.
(2006). In turn, an increase in average catchability means that
a reduction in eﬀort will yield smaller reduction of the fish-
ing mortality and have less of an impact on SSB than that im-
plied by a linear relationship linking catch to eﬀort. Results
from the simulation model show that ignoring this eﬀect and
hence under-estimating catchability will result in a lower than
expected SSB, a larger than expected catch, and higher than
expected revenues for the years simulated. If the possibility of
such behavior is accepted, then a policy intended to reduce the
fishing mortality rate should take such behavior into account.
The results of the analysis underline diﬃculties which may
arise when managing a fishery by attempting to control fishing
eﬀort. If fishing eﬀort is defined by a simple index such as
horse power-days at sea, even in the short-run non-linear re-
sponses to eﬀort change might be expected due to the fact that
inputs in the individual production function are substitutable,
which implies that profit maximising fishers not only choose
the most profitable trips, but also the most profitable combi-
nation of inputs. The results of this study indicate that such
flexibilities are at least in the short run not very large for the
fleet in question. This could be explained by the high degree
of specialisation and the rules in place for the design of other
inputs like engine and gear.
Our model assumes an exponential relationship between
catchability and eﬀort and between catches and eﬀort. As
stated in the material and methods section, the functional form
of this relation is chosen because of the need to have a contin-
uous, non-linear increasing relationship between catches and
eﬀort, and the economic background of this functional form.
Other functional forms such as a linear relationship between
catchability and eﬀort might lead to a better fit of the data,
in specific situations. However, changing the functional form
does not change the principle that the optimization behavior
of fishermen will increase catchability for target species in an
eﬀort limited situation and leads to higher fishing mortalities.
Moreover, using, e.g., a linear functional form might lead to
unrealistic negative revenues/landings in case of extrapolation.
Our measures are perhaps not as refined as we would like
them to be. For instance, we use monthly data in the ANOVA
when an analysis based on weekly data (Rijnsdorp 2006)
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would have yielded more variation and thereby greater
curvature. However, initial analysis shows that the eﬀects of
such refinements are limited. Greater refinement in the diﬀer-
entiation of areas might also be possible and lead to better re-
sults. In addition, we are underestimating the ability of fish-
ers to vary their behavior by only including the eﬀects of the
ship, area and season. Fishers undoubtedly have other means
to change their behavior, our variables account for only around
60% of the calculated variation. These factors taken together
mean that our b estimates, and therefore the resulting catcha-
bility variables, will be lower than the potentially achievable
estimates.
In addition, our analysis is simplistic in that it only looks
at the direct impacts of a reduction in eﬀort, and not the re-
sulting reactions of fishers. Two examples will help to illus-
trate the issue. First, in our analysis we assume that less valu-
able trips will be dropped, but price flexibilities may induce
frequency dependence, where eﬀort reductions cause price in-
creases and incentives for increasing eﬀort. The second ex-
ample involves the changes in eﬀort allocation as a result of
fleet dynamics. Given the variation in economic performance,
less profitable ships might be forced to withdraw from the fleet
given a big enough reduction in eﬀort. This will enable the re-
maining ships to extend their eﬀort. The eﬀect of exchanging
the most profitable trips from less profitable vessels for least
profitable trips of more profitable ships is not clear. A more
complete model would take into account these reactions and
interactions between the values of fishing trips after an eﬀort
reduction, but this would quickly become highly complex.
There are some other limits to the analysis used in this
paper, some of which can be surmounted using more data
and better analytical techniques, and some of which are less
tractable. First, we are limited to six years of data from 2001–
2006, and only during the last two years did eﬀort become
the limiting constraint. This analysis is limited to the reaction
of fishers to changes in eﬀort, making years 2005 and 2006
the most relevant years. The form of the data would ideally
reflect eﬀort restricted behavior. Second, we use only large
beam trawlers (horsepower > = 1500). Although all sizes of
ships could have been included in the analysis, the complex-
ity required to account for technical and behavioral diﬀerences
among the various classes of ships would make the analysis far
too complex for current purposes. Third, the measure of utility
is not ideal, we use the value of a trip, measured in terms of
the total value of all fish caught during a trip, divided by eﬀort,
measured by the horsepower and the number of days at sea
of a trip. A more thorough estimate of utility, for instance, one
that included the major variable costs of a trip. Better data does
exist for calculating profits for part of the fleet. In a related is-
sue, we make the simplifying assumption that the behavior of
fishers is expressed in their ability to choose among diﬀerent
seasons and areas, as well as those diﬀerences due to specific
ship characteristics. There are undoubtedly other factors influ-
encing utility, but we are limited in our ability to decipher those
factors by a lack of data. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
(Fare et al. 2001) could be used in future studies to identify
these factors.
Despite these drawbacks, the method used can be used
to get an idea of the changes in catchability resulting from
eﬀort restrictions. These can be very important in impact
assessments of management plans which include eﬀort limi-
tations as a means to reduce fishing mortality. In addition, our
method of valuing and ranking trips has the advantage of being
easy to implement and understand while the general approach
can be applied across fleets.
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